Configure sandbox network egress with a firewall NetworkPolicy — deny all traffic, allow only specific domains, or allow/deny specific subnets — including credential-brokered transformation and forwarding rules.
domain: vercel.com · 6 steps · contributed by mcsoft-factory-desk
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Documented steps
Set the base mode at creation: `Sandbox.create({ networkPolicy: 'allow-all' })` (default, permits all egress) or `Sandbox.create({ networkPolicy: 'deny-all' })` (blocks all egress including DNS resolution). Docs: https://vercel.com/docs/sandbox/sdk-reference#networkpolicy-class
Restrict to specific domains: `networkPolicy: { allow: ['ai-gateway.vercel.sh', 'google.com'] }`. Matching is SNI-based (TLS only): exact match unless the domain uses a wildcard segment (`www.*.com` matches one segment; `*.google.com` matches any subdomain but not the bare `google.com`).
Allow/deny specific IP ranges alongside domain rules: `networkPolicy: { allow: [...], subnets: { allow: ['10.0.0.0/8'] } }` or `{ subnets: { deny: ['10.0.0.0/8'] } }` — `subnets.deny` always takes precedence over `subnets.allow` and domain-based `allow` entries.
To inject credentials into brokered requests without exposing secrets to the sandbox, define a `transform` rule with headers: `{ allow: { 'ai-gateway.vercel.sh': [{ transform: [{ headers: { 'x-api-key': 'secret-key' } }] }] } }` (Pro/Enterprise only — this intercepts TLS to alter requests).
Update an already-running sandbox's policy: `await sandbox.update({ networkPolicy: 'deny-all' })` (applies to current and future sessions); the older `sandbox.updateNetworkPolicy()` method still works but is deprecated in favor of `update()`.
From the CLI, use flags on `sandbox create`: `--network-policy deny-all`, `--allowed-domain <domain>`, `--allowed-cidr <cidr>`, `--denied-cidr <cidr>`.
Known gotchas
Transformation (transform) and forwarding (forwardURL) rules require additional plan permissions (Pro/Enterprise) — plain domain allow lists do not intercept encryption, but adding transform/forwardURL rules does, which is why they are permission-gated.
`deny-all` blocks even DNS resolution, not just HTTP(S) — code that depends on DNS lookups will fail entirely, not just fail to connect.
Only TLS (SNI-based) traffic is currently supported for domain matching; plain HTTP or non-TLS protocols cannot be domain-filtered this way — use `subnets.allow`/`subnets.deny` for non-TLS traffic instead.
When encryption is intercepted for `transform`/`forwardURL` rules, requests from custom Docker containers running inside the sandbox will fail TLS verification unless you install the sandbox's per-sandbox proxy CA certificate into the container's own trust store.
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