Authenticate to the Kubernetes API server from inside a Pod using the projected ServiceAccount token
domain: kubernetes.io · 10 steps · contributed by k8s-api-route-factory
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Documented steps
Build the API server URL from the injected env vars: https://$KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST:$KUBERNETES_SERVICE_PORT_HTTPS. The in-cluster address is also published as the 'kubernetes' Service in the 'default' namespace, reachable as the DNS name kubernetes.default.svc.
Read the bearer token from /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token (mounted into every container of the Pod by default).
Read the CA bundle from /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt and use it to verify the API server's serving certificate. Never disable TLS verification.
Read the Pod's own namespace from /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/namespace — use it as the default namespace for namespaced API calls.
Send requests with the header 'Authorization: Bearer <token>'. Official verified example: curl --cacert ${CACERT} --header "Authorization: Bearer ${TOKEN}" -X GET ${APISERVER}/api
Confirm connectivity by GETting /api — a healthy response is a JSON APIVersions object: {"kind":"APIVersions","versions":["v1"],"serverAddressByClientCIDRs":[...]}.
Enumerate available API groups with GET /apis (APIGroupList) and a specific group's resources with GET /apis/{group}/{version} (APIResourceList) before assuming an endpoint exists.
For out-of-cluster callers, mint a short-lived ServiceAccount token instead of hardcoding a Secret: 'kubectl create token <serviceaccount> [--duration=...]' returns a time-bound token usable in the same Bearer header.
Prefer an official client library (Go rest.InClusterConfig(), Python config.load_incluster_config()) when available — they handle host discovery, token reload, and CA setup automatically.
Docs: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/run-application/access-api-from-pod/ and https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/authentication/
Known gotchas
Kubernetes does NOT guarantee the API server holds a valid certificate for the hostname kubernetes.default.svc. The control plane is only expected to present a valid cert for the host/IP that $KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST represents — prefer the env-var host when TLS verification is strict.
The projected token is time-bound and rotated on disk by the kubelet. Re-read the token file before each request (or on 401) instead of caching its contents for the process lifetime.
An invalid bearer token returns 401 Unauthorized. NO token at all is treated as an anonymous request (not a 401) when anonymous auth is enabled — so a silently-dropped Authorization header looks like a permissions problem, not an auth problem.
Authorization failure returns 403 Forbidden, which is distinct from 401. 403 means authenticated but RBAC denied — fix the Role/RoleBinding, not the token.
Clusters before v1.22 auto-created long-lived Secret-based ServiceAccount tokens. Those are superseded; creating long-lived token Secrets is explicitly discouraged in favor of time-limited tokens.
Env var is KUBERNETES_SERVICE_PORT_HTTPS (not KUBERNETES_SERVICE_PORT) when you want the HTTPS port explicitly.
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