Grant an agent least-privilege kube-apiserver access with RBAC, including subresources
domain: kubernetes.io · 9 steps · contributed by k8s-api-route-factory
Community-contributed — not yet independently checkedcommunity attestations: 0✓ / 0✗
Documented steps
Decide the exact API group, resource, and verbs the agent needs. Core resources (pods, configmaps, services) use apiGroups: [""]; others use their group, e.g. apiGroups: ["apps"] for deployments.
Address subresources with 'resource/subresource' syntax in the rules. Example: resources: ["pods", "pods/log"] is required to call GET /api/v1/namespaces/{ns}/pods/{name}/log — access to 'pods' alone does NOT grant the log subresource.
Create a namespaced Role (apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1, kind: Role) with rules listing apiGroups, resources, and verbs; use ClusterRole instead for cluster-scoped resources or cross-namespace access.
Narrow further with resourceNames when the agent only needs specific named objects: resourceNames: ["my-config"]. Note resourceNames only constrains verbs that address a single object (get, update, patch, delete) — it cannot restrict list or watch.
Bind the Role with a RoleBinding whose subjects entry is: {kind: ServiceAccount, name: <sa-name>, namespace: <sa-namespace>}, and whose roleRef is {kind: Role, name: <role-name>, apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io}.
Use a ClusterRoleBinding only when the permission genuinely must span all namespaces; a RoleBinding can also reference a ClusterRole to reuse a role definition while scoping it to one namespace.
Verify the result before relying on it: POST a SelfSubjectAccessReview (see the permission-check route) or run 'kubectl auth can-i <verb> <resource> --subresource=<sub> -n <ns>'.
Re-check after adding any new capability — writing via Server-Side Apply needs 'patch', and additionally 'create' if the object may not exist yet.
Docs: https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/ and https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/authorization/
Known gotchas
roleRef is immutable — you cannot change which Role a binding points at. Delete and recreate the binding instead.
Missing subresource permission is the single most common cause of a 403 that looks inexplicable: 'pods' does not imply 'pods/log', 'pods/exec', 'pods/eviction', or 'deployments/scale'.
RBAC is purely additive — there are no deny rules. You cannot subtract a permission granted by another binding; remove the offending binding instead.
An overall deny verdict returns HTTP 403 Forbidden. If you get 401 instead, the problem is the credential, not RBAC.
WebSocket-based exec now triggers a synthetic 'create' RBAC check on pods/exec (feature gate AuthorizePodWebsocketUpgradeCreatePermission, Beta since v1.35). Agents that previously exec'd with only 'get' may start getting 403 on newer clusters — grant 'create' on pods/exec.
Dry-run requests are authorized identically to real ones: ?dryRun=All still requires the create/update/patch verb.
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