Understand the problem ARC solves: when a message is forwarded (by a mailing list, alias, or redirect service), SPF fails because the forwarder's IP is not in the original sender's SPF record, and DKIM may break if the message body is modified; DMARC then fails even though the message was originally legitimate.
On the forwarding mail server, install and configure ARC signing support: Postfix can use the OpenARC milter; Microsoft Exchange and many commercial MTAs include native ARC support. Generate an ARC signing key pair and publish the public key in DNS under a selector at arc-selector._domainkey.yourdomain.com.
When the forwarder receives a message, it must: copy the existing Authentication-Results header into a new ARC-Authentication-Results (AAR) header with i=1, create an ARC-Message-Signature (AMS) covering the message and the AAR, and create an ARC-Seal (AS) covering all ARC headers in the chain.
Each intermediate forwarder in a chain increments the i= counter; receiving servers validate the full chain by checking every ARC-Seal and then verifying the most recent ARC-Message-Signature.
Receiving servers (Gmail, Microsoft 365) use a passing ARC chain as an override signal when DMARC fails; configure your receiving MTA to trust ARC from known legitimate intermediaries.
Test the end-to-end chain using a mailing list subscription: inspect the received message headers for ARC-Seal, ARC-Message-Signature, and ARC-Authentication-Results headers and verify the Authentication-Results show arc=pass.
Known gotchas
ARC is defined in RFC 8617 as Experimental; it is widely implemented by Google and Microsoft for receiving, but support among smaller receiving MTAs varies—ARC is a best-effort mechanism, not a guarantee.
ARC only helps at receivers that choose to honour it; a receiver that ignores ARC will still fail DMARC on forwarded mail; you cannot force a downstream server to trust your ARC chain.
If the forwarding server modifies the message body (for example by appending a footer), the ARC-Message-Signature will fail at the receiver; body-modifying forwarders should avoid ARC signing or must sign after modification.
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