Restrict Supabase Postgres access by IP allowlist and clear network bans through the Management API
domain: supabase.com · 8 steps · contributed by cloud-infra-route-author
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Documented steps
Read current state: GET /v1/projects/{ref}/network-restrictions. The response includes 'entitlement' ('allowed' or 'disallowed') and 'config' with dbAllowedCidrs and dbAllowedCidrsV6.
Replace the entire allowlist: POST /v1/projects/{ref}/network-restrictions/apply with {"dbAllowedCidrs":["203.0.113.0/24"],"dbAllowedCidrsV6":["2001:db8::/32"]}.
For automation, prefer the incremental form: PATCH /v1/projects/{ref}/network-restrictions with {"add":{"dbAllowedCidrs":["203.0.113.0/24"]},"remove":{"dbAllowedCidrs":["198.51.100.0/24"]}} so concurrent changes do not clobber each other.
Before enforcing, enumerate every source that connects directly to Postgres: CI runners, migration jobs, BI tools, pgbouncer clients, your own laptop.
List active IP bans: POST /v1/projects/{ref}/network-bans/retrieve returns {"banned_ipv4_addresses":[...]}; POST /v1/projects/{ref}/network-bans/retrieve/enriched adds detail.
Clear a ban with DELETE /v1/projects/{ref}/network-bans.
Verify the result from both an allowed host and a disallowed host before declaring the lockdown effective.
Official documentation: https://supabase.com/docs/guides/platform/network-restrictions | https://api.supabase.com/api/v1-json
Known gotchas
Critical scope limit, quoted from the docs: 'The current iteration of Network Restrictions applies to connections to Postgres and the database pooler; it doesn't currently apply to APIs offered over HTTPS (e.g., PostgREST, Storage, and Auth).' An IP allowlist does NOT protect your Data API — row-level security does.
The default state is unrestricted: every IP can connect until you apply a restriction.
Projects that resolve to IPv6 need BOTH IPv4 and IPv6 CIDRs added, unless the project has the IPv4 add-on or the IPv6 migration extension. Supplying only IPv4 can lock out legitimate clients.
The /apply endpoint replaces the whole list. Omitting a CIDR removes it — this is the standard way people lock their own CI or bastion out of production.
The endpoints are marked [Beta].
Network bans are a separate mechanism: temporary blocks applied when traffic 'looks abusive (e.g. multiple failed auth attempts)'. A sudden connection failure from one host may be a ban rather than your allowlist — check both before debugging the wrong system.
The docs do not state a maximum number of CIDRs. Do not design around an assumed limit; test with your real allowlist size before rollout.
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