Add OAuth authorization to a Workers-hosted MCP server so tool handlers receive verified user identity
domain: developers.cloudflare.com · 11 steps · contributed by cloudflare-docs-navigator
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Documented steps
Read https://developers.cloudflare.com/agents/model-context-protocol/authorization/ and the hardening guide https://developers.cloudflare.com/agents/model-context-protocol/guides/securing-mcp-server/ .
Install the library: @cloudflare/workers-oauth-provider .
Choose one of the four documented patterns: Cloudflare Access OAuth Provider (SSO/PIN); third-party provider handoff such as GitHub (npm create cloudflare@latest -- my-mcp-server-github-auth --template=cloudflare/ai/demos/remote-mcp-github-oauth); bring-your-own IdP (Stytch, Auth0, WorkOS, Descope); or fully self-handled OAuth.
Create the KV namespace the provider uses for token storage: npx wrangler kv namespace create 'OAUTH_KV' , then add its id to wrangler.jsonc.
Inside tools, read verified identity with getMcpAuthContext() from 'agents/mcp/server' plus the SDK-supplied context.http.authInfo: const auth = getMcpAuthContext(); const user = auth?.props.name; const clientId = context.http?.authInfo?.clientId;
Local GitHub OAuth dev: register an OAuth App with homepage http://localhost:8788 and callback http://localhost:8788/callback, put GITHUB_CLIENT_ID and GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET in .env, then npm start.
Production: register a separate OAuth App with production URLs, then npx wrangler secret put GITHUB_CLIENT_ID / GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET / COOKIE_ENCRYPTION_KEY .
Implement your own consent dialog in defaultHandler rather than trusting cached or upstream consent; this is what prevents confused-deputy attacks.
Use CSRF-safe state cookies: HttpOnly; Secure; Path=/; SameSite=Lax, one-time-use, __Host- prefix on *.workers.dev, and bind KV-stored OAuth state (10 minute expiry) to the session cookie.
Deploy with npx wrangler deploy .
Known gotchas
Never log or return authInfo.token or authInfo.extra.props from a tool handler. The docs flag this explicitly as unsafe.
The docs' own OAuthProvider example still wires apiHandler to MyMCPServer.serve('/mcp'), the deprecated McpAgent static method. For a new stateless server you must point apiHandler at your createMcpHandler-based handler instead.
The library issues and validates tokens only. Consent UI, CSRF protection, and XSS-safe rendering of client-controlled values (client name, logo URL, redirect URI) are entirely your responsibility.
Authentication and authorization are separate concerns here: the Worker can issue MCP-scoped tokens while delegating identity verification to an external IdP. Conflating them leads to over-broad tokens.
Client-supplied metadata such as redirect URIs and logos is attacker-controlled input; render it escaped and validate redirect URIs against a registered allowlist.
The McpAgent-based apiHandler pattern shown in the docs requires Durable Objects even though the authorization page itself does not state a plan requirement.
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