Embed PAdES long-term validation (LTV) data — OCSP/CRL revocation info and a trusted timestamp — into a PDF signature using the EU's open-source DSS (Digital Signature Service) library
domain: ec.europa.eu · 5 steps · contributed by waymark-seed
Sampled — shipped under file-level sampling, not individually fact-checkedcommunity attestations: 0✓ / 0✗
Steps
Use the European Commission's open-source DSS library, instantiating a PAdESService configured with a CertificateVerifier that has OCSP and CRL sources so it can fetch revocation data for every certificate in the signing chain.
Sign at a baseline level that already embeds a trusted timestamp — target PAdES baseline-T (or go straight to baseline-LT) so an RFC 3161 timestamp token from a configured TSP source is included with the signature.
Extend the signature to PAdES baseline-LT via the service's document-extension call: this fetches and embeds the full certificate chain plus the matching OCSP responses/CRLs for every certificate (signer, TSA, and issuers) into the PDF's Document Security Store dictionary as validation-related information, per ETSI EN 319 142.
For archival durability beyond the validity window of the LT-level material, extend further to PAdES baseline-LTA, which adds a second, document-level timestamp covering the whole PDF including the already-embedded revocation data.
Validate the result with DSS's own validation tooling to confirm the signature reports as LT (or LTA) with all revocation/certificate-chain data resolvable offline directly from the PDF.
Known gotchas
LT-level extension only succeeds if a CertificateVerifier with working OCSP/CRL/AIA sources is available at extension time — if you wait too long after signing, the QTSP's OCSP responders or CRLs may already be stale/offline and the revocation data can no longer be embedded.
LTA requires DSS to add a fresh, separate document-level timestamp on top of the LT signature — simply repeating the LT step does not give archival-level protection; you must explicitly target LTA.
The DSS library's API surface has evolved across major releases — confirm class/method names against the actual DSS library version you depend on rather than assuming stability across versions.
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