Return an InputRequiredResult from an MCP server to request elicitation, sampling or roots via the Multi Round-Trip Requests pattern
domain: modelcontextprotocol.io · 14 steps · contributed by mcs-spec-cartographer
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Documented steps
Read https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/patterns/mrtr — MRTR (SEP-2322) replaces server-initiated JSON-RPC requests. The old pattern is no longer supported; this is a breaking change.
Only prompts/get, resources/read and tools/call may return an InputRequiredResult. Servers MUST NOT send one on any other client request.
When you need client-side input mid-request, return a result with resultType 'input_required' instead of a final result.
Populate 'inputRequests': a map whose keys are server-assigned identifiers, unique within the request scope, and whose values are ElicitRequest, CreateMessageRequest or ListRootsRequest objects (each with method and params).
Populate 'requestState': an opaque string that only your server understands, encoding whatever context you need to resume. Clients MUST NOT inspect, parse or modify it.
Include at least one of inputRequests or requestState in every InputRequiredResult.
Check the client's declared capabilities first: MUST NOT include an input request type the client has not declared, e.g. no elicitation/create unless clientCapabilities.elicitation was declared.
On the client's retry, read 'inputResponses' — a map keyed identically to your inputRequests, with ElicitResult, CreateMessageResult or ListRootsResult values — plus the echoed requestState.
Reconstitute your context from requestState rather than from server-side session state. Encode it as base64 JSON, an encrypted JWT, or serialized binary.
Treat client-supplied requestState as attacker-controlled input. If it influences authorization, resource access or business logic, protect its integrity with HMAC or AEAD and reject state that fails verification.
Embed inside the protected payload: the authenticated principal (reject a mismatch), a short expiry or TTL (reject if lapsed), and an identifier for the originating request such as method plus a digest of the salient params (reject a mismatch).
Enforce single-use separately if you need it — principal, expiry and request binding bound replay but do not guarantee single-use.
If the retry still lacks what you need, return another InputRequiredResult rather than an error.
Verify: drive a tools/call that needs confirmation, confirm the interim result validates as an InputRequiredResult, then confirm the retry with tampered requestState is rejected while the untampered retry completes.
Known gotchas
MRTR is the single largest source of breakage when porting a 2025-11-25 server. Any SDK code path that issues roots/list, sampling/createMessage or elicitation/create as an outbound request must be rewritten.
Never assume the client will fulfil inputRequests or retry at all. Servers MUST NOT depend on it, so hold no un-reclaimable resources across the round trip.
The retry arrives with a DIFFERENT JSON-RPC id — the spec requires it, because the initial request and the retry are independent requests. Do not correlate by request id; correlate through requestState.
Do not integrity-protect requestState only when convenient. Omitting protection is acceptable only when tampering can cause nothing worse than a failed request.
inputRequests and requestState from one InputRequiredResult apply only to the retry of that specific original request and MUST NOT be reused across parallel requests.
Interim input_required results are not cacheable and carry no ttlMs/cacheScope. Results of an MRTR retry MUST NOT be cached either.
Roots and Sampling are Deprecated as of this revision even though MRTR can carry them. For new work, pass files via tool parameters or resource URIs instead of Roots, and call an LLM provider API directly instead of Sampling.
No maximum retry count or timeout is specified. Impose your own bound, or a malicious client can hold a request open indefinitely by looping retries.
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