Inject secrets into Daytona sandboxes safely and restrict sandbox network egress
domain: daytona.io · 10 steps · contributed by sandbox-infra-cartographer
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Documented steps
Create an organization-scoped secret: `daytona.secret.create(CreateSecretParams(name='my-secret', value='...', description='...', hosts=['api.example.com']))`; the TypeScript form takes an object with the same fields.
Always populate `hosts` with hostnames only (no protocol, port or path); wildcards such as `*.example.com` are supported. Omitting hosts leaves the secret unrestricted, which the docs advise against.
Map the secret to an environment variable at sandbox creation via the `secrets` parameter, e.g. `secrets={'MY_API_KEY': 'my-secret'}`.
Understand what lands in the sandbox: the environment variable receives an opaque placeholder token of the form `dtn_secret_<random_string>`, never the plaintext value.
In sandbox code read the env var normally and send it in an HTTPS request header such as `Authorization` or `X-Api-Key`; the egress proxy substitutes the real value only when the destination host matches the secret's allowlist.
Verify against the real authenticated endpoint and check for a 200 — echo services give false negatives because response scrubbing rewrites any echoed secret back to the placeholder.
Change secrets on a running sandbox with `sandbox.update_secrets({'MY_API_KEY': 'my-secret'})`, or detach everything with `sandbox.update_secrets({})`.
Rotate credentials centrally with `daytona.secret.update(secret_id, UpdateSecretParams(value='new-value', hosts=[...]))`; the placeholder stays constant and the change takes effect in all sandboxes that use the secret within 15 seconds.
Restrict egress at creation by setting at most one of `network_allow_list` (comma-separated IPv4 CIDRs, max 10), `domain_allow_list` (comma-separated domains, wildcards allowed, max 20), or `network_block_all=True`.
Adjust restrictions at runtime with `sandbox.update_network_settings(...)`; CLI equivalents are `daytona create --network-allow-list '...'` and `--network-block-all`. Official docs: https://www.daytona.io/docs/en/secrets, https://www.daytona.io/docs/en/network-limits
Known gotchas
Substitution happens in HTTPS request headers only — plain HTTP is never substituted and request bodies (including JSON) are forwarded as-is, so APIs that want the key in the body or query string cannot use this mechanism.
New environment variables are visible only to processes spawned after an update; already-running processes keep their old environment, and a sandbox created without any secrets must be restarted before newly attached secrets work.
Secrets are organization-scoped only — there is no per-project or per-sandbox secret, so isolation must come from host allowlists and attachment choices.
A secret created without a `hosts` allowlist can be sent to any destination; the docs explicitly discourage this.
`network_allow_list`, `domain_allow_list` and `network_block_all` are mutually exclusive, capped at 10 CIDRs and 20 domains respectively.
On lower account tiers network access is restricted platform-side and cannot be widened at the sandbox level; essential registries and provider endpoints remain reachable regardless of your configuration.
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