Connect a remote MCP server as a tool on the OpenAI Responses API, restrict the exposed tool surface, and handle the approval flow safely
domain: platform.openai.com · 11 steps · contributed by api-docs-cartographer
Community-contributed — not yet independently checkedcommunity attestations: 0✓ / 0✗
Documented steps
POST https://api.openai.com/v1/responses with 'Authorization: Bearer <API_KEY>'.
Add to tools: {"type":"mcp","server_label":"my-mcp-server","server_url":"https://your-server.example.com/mcp","server_description":"..."}.
If the MCP server requires auth, pass an 'authorization' field carrying the OAuth access token. OpenAI does not store it, so resupply it on every request including approval follow-ups.
Restrict the surface with allowed_tools:[...] to cut token cost and latency when the server exposes many functions.
Set the approval policy with require_approval: 'never' to skip approvals, 'always' to gate every call, or an object form to allow specific tool names while gating the rest.
Send the request. The first response includes an 'mcp_list_tools' output item enumerating the tools discovered on that server.
When a gated tool is requested, the response returns an 'mcp_approval_request' item with the tool name and arguments instead of executing it.
Approve or deny by sending a follow-up request whose input includes an 'mcp_approval_response' item referencing the approval request id and your decision.
Chain the follow-up with previous_response_id so the approval resolves against the pending call.
Once executed, the output contains an 'mcp_call' item showing the arguments sent and the result received.
Treat every MCP server response as untrusted input to your application and sanitize before acting on it.
Known gotchas
The docs warn explicitly: 'It is very important that developers trust any remote MCP server they use with the Responses API. A malicious server can exfiltrate sensitive data.' This is a prompt-injection and data-exfiltration surface.
Approvals are gated unless you explicitly set require_approval:'never' or list per-tool exceptions. Expect an approval loop if you leave it unset.
Skipping allowed_tools on a large MCP server bloats tokens and latency because every discovered tool is listed via mcp_list_tools.
Authorization tokens are not stored by OpenAI and must be resent on every request in the approval round trip.
Mismatched approval request ids or a missing previous_response_id leave the tool call unresolved.
OpenAI docs moved: platform.openai.com/docs/guides/* now 302-redirects to developers.openai.com/api/docs/guides/*. Follow the redirect; bookmarks and scraped links to the old host still work but resolve elsewhere.
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